India has made the first step to escape an international nuclear isolation. Government of this country has enlisted the support of the regional socialistic party "Samajwadi" in the parliament. Now there is no threat of the no-confidence vote to the cabinet of ministers, and government can begin realizing final steps of the nuclear deal with the USA.
Certainly, Amar Singh, "Samajwadi" general-secretary assures journalists that his party won't change its negative attitude to the nuclear deal until the government, or precisely prime-minister Manmohan Singh - won't give public answers to the questions of the left political parties.
Though, even if the declaration of the cabinet chief will follow, it won't have any juridical liabilities. According to the Indian constitution deputies don't have a right to ratify international agreements and the only thing that government was afraid of, was a possibility of the liable parliament coalition split. After the appearance of "Samajwadi" such a thread was definitely eliminated.
With the obvious purpose to calm his Muslim electorate, Amar Singh demands from the Manmohan Singh "thorough explanations" on the double voting in support of the anti-Iranian resolution of the Indian delegate at the IAEA Governors Board. Observes forecast that in this situation government will manage to give only general assurances and oaths that Deli is on the way of condemnation of its old friend and neighbor Teheran and this condemnation has nothing to do with the nuclear deal.
Though there are no final declarations about the changes within the pro-governmental coalition in the Indian parliament, changes in the relations between the governing party INC and its former communist alliances became obvious. Proamerican oriented Indian Mass Media with unconcealed pleasure reported that INC doesn't make haste on answering the communists' ultimatum that demands the immediate publication of the guaranties agreement between India and IAEA.
Historical background of the problem
India was one of the first Asian states that began thinking of the nuclear energy development - peaceful one, and as it was found out later also the military. On the 4th of August 1956 on the site of the Nuclear Research Center named after Homi Bhabha (BARC) for the first time the first Asian research reactor of the British production APSARA was launched. According to the official version reactor has got his name from the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Neru, luminous rods reminded him of the beauty of the heavenly seducer-maids "apsar".
On the first stage nuclear Indian program was developed according to the "Colombo plan", formed in 1950 to consolidate splitting British Empire. The plan provided obligations of Great Britain and its most developed dominions such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand to grant technical assistance to India, Pakistan and Ceylon.
"Colombo plan" contributed to the most important nuclear acquisition. A heavy-water reactor CIRUS (first launch 10 of July 1960) was supplied from Canada to India, and India had gained an opportunity for its specialists to participate from the very beginning in designing, producing and constructing of the reactor. As a result CIRUS has produced plutonium for the first Indian nuclear shells and experience, achieved at this facility, gave India the possibility to launch the program for building their proper "small CANDU" (heavy water reactors PHWR of a small and middle capacity).
At the end of sixties came the American's turn. Two blocks with boiling water reactors BWR-320, constructed by the "General Electric" company have produced there first kWh at the Tarapur site. At this point foreigners' expansion on the Indian nuclear market was stopped for a long time - peaceful nuclear energy was hampered by its military brother.
On the 22nd of October 1964 CIA stated: "Indian government has all the elements, necessary to produce nuclear arms and has an opportunity for the quick bomb assembling." Deli was justifying its intentions by the military Chinese thread and appealed to the growing offensive potential of the People's Republic.
Quotation from the declassified CIA analytic report, prepared in the middle sixties:
"Soviets, probably, won't make a proposal of striking a requital blow at China if India will be attacked. Though, hostility between Russia and China and harm that will be caused to the Russian long-term interests by the nuclear proliferation will become the arguments for this offer, Russians will , most likely, find potential losses in the relations between communists parties very significant."
Looking after the development of nuclear military program became one of the priorities of American intelligence in India beginning from 1966. That made nuclear tests on the "Pohran" proving ground, realized by India in 1974, more unexpected for Washington. Though in Deli they were persuading of the "exclusively peaceful" nature of the explosions, worried Americans have created urgently an international Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), main task of that group was to follow and control export of nuclear materials and technologies to India and other liminal states that were close to creating a nuclear bomb.
Control and prohibition functions of NSG were not mentioned in the main non-proliferation document Non-proliferation treaty, and this organization looked very proamerican for the first years. That is why many big powers including Soviet Union preferred to ignore the group and its prohibitions.
That allowed the first and the last soviet president Michael Gorbachev to sign with the Indian prime-minister Rajiv Gandhi on the 20th of November 1988 an agreement on turnkey building of two units with VVER-1000 reactors at Kundankulam site. On the known reasons project could have been left on the dusty shelves of the diplomatic archives, if 10 years later Evgeny Adamov and his Indian colleagues M.R.Srinivasan and R.Chidambaram haven't guessed to use it for the backdated justification of the agreement on the same issue.
Nuclear tests in 1998 in India (Pohran-2) and Pakistan, Non-proliferation treaty unification and geopolitical changers after the collapse of the Soviet Union were in favor of the NSG status. Nowadays completely all the world nuclear materials and technologies suppliers have united within the group, and main principals of NSG became more tough and implacable to those, who would like to get nuclear arsenals going against Non-proliferation treaty. No any company can sign the contracts with India on supplying reactors, and imported uranium can go to the Indian NPPs (not all the plants) only if there is a real threat to the nuclear security.
Nuclear deal between India and USA
Deprived of the large uranium resources, India didn't manage to create more or less significant nuclear sector. Large quantity of operating reactors (17) shouldn't deceive - their total capacity is less than 4 GWe (el.). Indian PHWR reactors are mostly cheap and reliable, but have a low capacity - 220 mWe (el.).
For the state with the population more than 1billion people its paltry today's nuclear park obviously is not enough. Indian nuclear specialists plan to overcome natural limitation of uranium resources with the help of fast neutron breeders and thorium reactors, but for their large scale application some decades will be needed. In the short term prospective only foreign assistance can help Indians.
To 2020 India plans to build at least 5 fast neutron sodium reactors with the total capacity 2,5 gWe (el.) and after this begin sodium reactors integration. Though this way India will be the world leader in the fast neutron reactor direction, such amount of "Indian fast neutron reactors" will not be able to solve the energy problems of the country.
One more problem was created by the Indian nuclear office. Blindly imitating the world fashion of plant capacity factor demands increasing, Indian nuclear specialists have consumed all the stored reserves of extracted uranium. As a result mining part of the nuclear ministry fails to supply uranium to the fuel plants in time, and Indian NPPs are loaded now only on the half of their capacity. Indians had to postpone the launch of two new blocks on the "Radgastan" NPP because of the uranium deficit. Situation can be changed also at the expense of foreign supplies.
Problems of the Indian nuclear energy sector are not taken into consideration by the NSG group where all the decisions are taken only by consensus. All the nuclear trade restrictions imposed on India will be immediately removed if India will join the Non-proliferation treaty and dismount all its nuclear shells. India pretending to be the superpower can't afford this. So only someone third, influential enough within the world community and having good relations with Deli, can break this vicious circle.
United States have taken upon themselves such a role. On the 18th of July 2005 in Washington US President George Bush and Indian Prime-minister Manmohan Singh presented joint declaration where stated that Washington is ready to help Deli to put an end to the international blockade. This day a so-called Indo-American nuclear deal has officially started.
After the joint declaration of the state leaders experts and diplomats elaborated a detailed plan of actions, necessary to bring this deal into life. The plan contains the following steps:
As a bonus to the mentioned activities, India could obtain a right to cooperate in the sphere of peaceful nuclear energy not only with USA, but with the other states, including Russia and France. Sequence of realizing these activities was repeatedly challenged by the interested parties, but finally they were fixed in the mentioned order.
It is obvious, that realization of the nuclear deal has protracted. After three years from the Bush-Singh declaration only 4 items of the program were implemented. Beside technical and diplomatic difficulties - India insisted on its absolute and unconditional "rehabilitation" and USA wanted to use cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful nuclear energy as a deterring factor for the Indian nuclear military program - appeared political problems, above all in India.
According to the Indian constitution conclusion of international treaties is a prerogative of the government, but not of a parliament, and it means that opponents can get to abolishing of this or that agreement only by the "supreme measure" - declaring a vote of no-confidence to the cabinet of ministers. Manmohan Singh could not pay attention on the dissatisfaction of the parliament opposition minority if he has had a majority of the deputies' votes. But the governing party can't boast of it - its mandate depends on the support of four communist fractions, united under the banner of the "Left front".
Communists didn't like this nuclear deal from the moment of its appearance, but for the time being refrained from the decisive actions. Economic situation in the country is not favorable to the temporal powers and in the case of the no-confidence vote and the following pre-term elections a possibility of religion nationalists winning the elections is great. Such a perspective suits neither "congressists" nor "comrades".
But while the negotiation process approached to the item #4 (India and IAEA should prepare the draft of the agreement on the guarantees for the Indian nuclear civil sites) objections of the Reds became more and more tough. The matter is that the fourth item is the last one where India should play an active role. During the discussions at the Governors Board, USA congress and NSG conference India will play the role of the passive observer and no one will take into account objections of the Indian communists.
In autumn 2007 Indian government and communists agreed to create a working committee to elaborate a common strategy for the last stages of the nuclear deal on its sessions. Left powers immediately headed for delaying of the process demanding supplementary information from the government and additional time for its analysis.
As a result the only thing that was done during the first half of the year 2008 is a draft of the agreement on the IAEA guarantees. Communists have forbidden giving it for consideration to the nuclear agency Governing Board and especially signing it under the threat of the recall of their support to the government in the parliament.
But in July 12, 2008 after long-term politic maneuvers Manmohan Singh, Sonia Gandy and their assistances finally managed to find the decision of the no-confidence vote problem. Socialists from the regional party "Samadgvadi" agreed to help the governing coalition, replacing the communists.
Till recently "Samajwadi" was criticizing the nuclear deal as tough as the "Left front" was doing, and was also thinking over its role in the Indian democracy. Among the leaders of the socialists appeared an idea to create the so-called "third power coalition", able to challenge two traditional centers of political power in India - party of the Gandy's clan (INC) and the party of the right nationalists.
But as time has shown "Samajwadi's" pretensions were insolvent. Socialists' positions in their "home" state Uttar-Pradesh have become weak and a perspective of the total confuse appeared indistinctly before the leaders of "Samajwadi" in case if new parliament elections will take place in the near future.
Choosing between the principals and survival, socialists have voted for the last one. Voices of "Samadgvadi" fraction will be enough to block the potential un-confidence vote to the government. So there were no any inner obstacles left for India to realize the nuclear deal.
Positions of the parties
What will gain the main participants of the nuclear deal?
India
India will gain an opportunity to buy urgently uranium, necessary for the exploitation of the operating NPPs. Moreover India will be able to make a new step in the development of the nuclear energy, connected with the uranium stores (according to the generally accepted valuations India disposes of the uranium stores enough to exploit NPPs with the total capacity not more than 10 gWe (el.)).
The country can intensify a program of building heavy-water reactors PHWR of the increased capacity 700 MWe (el.), prospective of this alternative is very obscure because of the uranium deficit. Finally, India can buy light-water reactors abroad.Negotiating with foreign colleagues India is going to follow the principal "A site for every company". Russians can locate their supplies at the site in Kundankulam. For the French a new site in Dgaitapur is prepared. There are candidates to place American reactors. India is ready to buy reactors of several suppliers at once as it will give it an opportunity to increase significantly the capacity of the nuclear park up to 20, 40 or even 50 GWe (el.).
In a geopolitical aspect India will make an important step on the way to the complete legalization of its nuclear weapon. Remaining out of the Non-proliferation treaty (terms of the treaty don't allow to consider India as a nuclear power), nevertheless, India will get to removing of all the sanctions, imposed on it by the world community.
United States
It was said a lot about the participation of "Westinghouse", "General Electric" and other American nuclear companies in lobbing the nuclear deal. At first US state department supported the interests of American nuclear companies, for example Condoleezza Rice proposed India to mark out for Americans two orders on nuclear power generating units construction.
Now on the other side of the ocean they prefer to pass over in silence the desire to participate in the Indian market. But it is rather obvious that after the deal will come into power "Westinghouse" and "General Electrics" will immediately start talks with the Indian side about new units.
Geopolitical success of the nuclear deal can be added to the credit side of the republican administration of the White House, which is very important before the US president elections. Democrats - rivals of republicans also comprehend it. They have strong positions in the American parliament and will try to delay realization of the item about the ratification of "123" agreement until Washington will get a new president.
France
French position is rather simple. Nuclear deal will bring the AREVA group two orders on two units at "Dgaitapur" site with the prospective of building new units there. It answers President's Sarkozy policy, who thinks, that French EPR should appear in much possible quantity of states.
Russia
Russia unfortunately has lost an opportunity to become an intermediate between India and world community, giving the way to USA. Moscow hasn't managed to play a "bureaucratic" card and persuade Deli to extend the initial agreement about NPP "Kudankylam" on two units more.
After the deal comes into power Russia will loose its role of a monopolist at the Indian nuclear market that consisted in constructing of two units at NPP "Kydankylam", supplying nuclear fuel there and providing with uranium Indian nuclear power generating units that were under guarantee.
Indian units "Tarapur-1" and "Tarapur-2", also "Rajastan-1" and "Rajastan-2" are under the IAEA guarantees. It happened so because of the large participation of foreign companies in building of these units. Control of international inspectors allows under certain circumstances to deliver nuclear fuel or uranium for its production to these sites.
Russia has twice delivered the enriched uranium for "Tarapur-1" and "Tarapur-2". There is information, that Russia had also been delivering natural uranium for "Rajastan-1" and "Rajastan-2". At "Rosatom" State Corporation in unofficial talks they don't confirm this information, but at the same time don't deny it categorically.
Russia's benefit from the nuclear deal can be the following. It will allow Russian companies to get an order for two new units for "Kundankulam", and extend it on two units more in the future (according to other estimations Russia can pretend on 10 new orders for building power generating units on the territory of India). Economic profit of new bargains will certainly depend on the qualification of the negotiators from "Rosatom" State Corporation.
One more important area of collaboration can become cooperation in the sphere of fast neutron sodium reactors. Both Russia and India are devoted to the idea of closing the nuclear fuel cycle and integrating fast breeders in it. During the following decade our countries will keep the world leadership in the sphere of fast neutron reactors.
Bilateral cooperation can become very useful here, but it is possible to speak about only potential possibility, as India plans to keep the breeder program within the military sector of the nuclear energy.
SOURCE: Mikhail Storozhevoy, AtomInfo.Ru
DATE: July 16, 2008