The second Bulgarian nuclear power plant will have two lives. The first one was a "socialist" one, and the second - "capitalistic". Initially, it was erected to the glory of the everlasting friendship among peoples from the Eastern bloc, and now it is going to be completed for the sake of global energy safety. The first life was cut short with the start of political changes. Could it resurrect at the second attempt?
The first life of the Belene NPP (The Second Nuke) began in 1984. The USSR and Bulgaria signed an agreement on constructing a nuclear power plant on the bank of the Danube River. In case it was done, the energy system of the Balkan republic could have another 2,000 megawatts for starters.
The site was located right across the biggest Danubian island, Belene and just 7.5 km away from the border with Romania. Though the reactors, offered to the Bulgarians, were designed in the USSR, it was the Czechs, and to be more precise, Skodaexport, who contracted the production and assembly of the major equipment. Soviet experts handed all the technological documents and know-how over to the Czechs.
The construction of a modern nuclear power plant is a long and unhurried process. Over the following 6 years the Czechs succeeded in producing and carrying to Bulgaria mere 60 per cent of the total equipment, including one reactor shell, which is said to have unique operational characteristics. In 1990, the financing of the project was slashed and a year later it was brought to naught. The post-Chernobyl syndrome and financial troubles made the democratic cabinet, who assumed the power in Sofia to decree all the works on Belene to be suspended.
A decade or so had to elapse to see the resurrection of the Second Nuke. Bulgaria aspired for EU membership and United Europe required in exchange the decommissioning of the old Bulgarian units of Kozloduy NPP. In this case the Balkan country could face its status of electric power exporter lost and in the future, possible dependence on electricity supply from abroad. And it was at that moment, when Sofia thought of Belene.
In December 2002 the cabinet denounced the resolution on the suspension of the construction of the Second Nuke. In two years and a half a tender was invited for the completion of the Belene NPP. Among the first bidders was Russian Atomstroyexport to vie with their former allies from the Czech Skoda Alliance. Both companies push on the markets their own modifications of the "all-socialist" VVER-1000 reactor.
The Slavic Nuclear Battle
Everyone of the former partners within the nuclear socialist camp preferred to plead suit with Sofia united with western counterparts rather than alone. French-German alliance AREVA NP sided with Atomstroyexport. The Europeans conceded to undertake the supply of ventilating equipment, hydrogen recombination system and what is most important, the electronics. Wags were prompt to call the hybrid "Russian corpus with European brain". It may be worth mentioning, that a similar combination was successfully tested in China earlier.
As for the Czechs, they looked more self-confident at the tender for Belene than their competitors. Skoda Alliance intended to cope with all the future difficulties all by themselves without any exterior help. Only the American Westinghouse secured some support, promising in case of a win to supply the new plant with fresh fuel. Yet, the Czech company was among the assets of Russian businessman Kakha Bendukidze and in the course of the tender it was taken over by a group of persons, close to Gasprom. The fact that the gas monopolist controlled almost 50 per cent of Atomstroyexport was the seasoning of the situation.
No wonder that part of the Bulgarian public was firmly convinced that Skoda Alliance was a dummy bidder. Another thing boggles the imagination. The Czechs in fact were serious in vying with the Russian atomists and hoped to the very last moment that they could win.
The clash over Belene evolved according to all the rules of a thriller. Moscow chose the right moment to produce from the dusty archives documents of Soviet days, to the effect that Czechia lost the right to sell VVER-1000 abroad. It transpired that at the time, the Soviet Union presented Czechoslovakia with the reactor technologies on the condition that the country could make use of them only in the countries members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. With the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the voluntary winding up of the Council, the Soviet present naturally ceased to be in force.
In Pilsen they paid no attention to Moscow's attacks and with clenched teeth continued to select subcontractors and investors, who were not in a hurry to invest the needed billions of euros in the construction of the nuclear plant. Sofia also contributed its mite to aggravate the situation. In summer 2006 ambitious Bulgarian Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov delivered an ultimatum to the bidders: either to cut the price or the tender would be re-invited from the very start with other bidders.
The term for the selection of a main contractor for the construction of the plant was expiring. Moscow and Prague were getting tired. Reporters and observers, specializing in covering events in the area of nuclear power industry, started speaking that the Russian and Czech atomists have "burnt out" awaiting for so long the decision of Sofia. At that very moment Bulgarian authorities put an end to the Slavic nuclear battle.
On October 30, 2006, hardly waiting the results of the presidential elections run-off, won by Socialist Georgi Parvanov, the National Electricity Company (NEC) announced Atomstroyexport the winner of the tender. The Russians were entitled to mount in Belene two AES-92 VVER-1000 reactors, designed by specialist from Moscow and Podolsk. In cooperation with the Russian company will work the French and Germans from AREVA NP as well as the Bulgarian enterprises, which hold, according to the conditions of the tender, 30 per cent of the total cost of the project.
On January 18, 2008 during the visit of Russia's President Vladimir Putin, a signing ceremony was held of the so-called contract agreement on the construction of the Belene NPP. The agreement stipulates the prices and deadlines. Bulgaria will have to pay 3.997 billion euros for the two units, which are supposed to be commissioned in 2013-14.
Winners and Losers
The new nuke means a lot to Bulgaria. First of all, it would allow the country to retain its position of a leading power exporter in the region of the Balkans, which has been strongly undermined with the decommissioning of the four reactors of the Kozloduy NPP.
The present minister of economy and energy, Peter Dimitrov foretells that in the years to come the shortage of electricity in the Balkans can well exceed 50 per cent. The commissioning of the Belene NPP opens up broad perspectives before Bulgaria: the country could assume a stabilizing role in the region. In a televised speech on the national TV channel in January, Dimitrov went further to call Bulgaria an "energy hit" worldwide.
Undoubtedly, the construction of the nuclear plant will do good to the Bulgarian nuclear industry, securing Bulgaria's niche in the international nuclear elite. The natural process of preserving the knowledge and cognisance in the filed supposes continuous construction of nuclear power-generating units or otherwise, the accumulated experience is threatened to diminish due to the fact that specialists will find jobs elsewhere, or emigrate or even retire. Such worrying signals were already given: for example, there are no more skilled welders in the country. With the start of the construction of the Belene NPP, the Bulgarian atomists will be able to find a way out of the stagnation, resuming their natural development.
As for the domestic consumers, the Second Nuke could well prove to be a symbol of liberation or, at least, of independence from the Russian supplies of coals and gas. Bulgarian Premier Sergey Stanishev speaks openly, making no bones about his leftist political affiliation: "With no natural resources of gas, oil or top-grade coal Bulgaria's choice is in favour of the construction of the Belene NPP - it is mostly a choice in favour of energy independence from the coals supplies, which are provided more often than not by Russia."
It begs the question: is it profitable for Russia to save Bulgaria with its own hands from Russian organic energy carriers? Moscow answers positively and even shows readiness to lend loans to Sofia for the construction of the nuke, if the latter is unable to find the necessary funds on its own.
There is no contradiction in this position of Russia. First of all, the Belene project gives the Russian atomists the opportunity for the first time in history to sell their reactors in a EU Member State, which is a very important achievement, which could boost the reputation of the Russian nuclear companies on the eve of the forthcoming nuclear renaissance. Second, it's worth mentioning, that the large-scale joint energy projects, such as the Belene NPP, Southern Stream, etc., allow the pro-Russian lobby in Bulgaria to gain momentum.
The benevolence on the part of the local politicians and businessmen acquires special importance to Moscow, given the attempts of the American administration to influence negatively the Russian-Bulgarian relations. The following fact is indicative of how serious seems the interference of the USA: On the eve of Vladimir Putin's visit to Sofia, a "leakage" in strong and not quite diplomatic language was cooked up by some sources in the Kremlin for the leading media: "When we just start really progressing in bilateral relations, some bureaucrats from the State Department would pop up, pulling our coattails: "What do you need that for?"
But if the USA prefer not to voice their claims on the Belene NPP, in Romania the Second Nuke is subjected to slashing attacks. Romanian dailies release horror-articles on a regular basis, frightening the middlebrows and foreboding a new Chernobyl with the Bulgarian reactors.It is easy to guess about the reason for Romanians' discontent. The problem is that the country wanted to occupy this worthy and profitable niche of the major Balkan energy provider.
Romania has a nuclear plant of its own, Cernavoda, using two CANDU reactors, made in Canada, and plans to construct two more of the same type in the foreseeable future. In October 2006, Bucharest attempted to take soundings if Sofia would not drop the nuclear plans, close the Belene project and become Romania's partner in the extended Cernavoda NPP. Romania met with the resounding rebuff of Bulgaria. Yordan Georgiev, a high official at the Energy Ministry, called the Romanian nuclear reactors "a 1950s technology", reminding that these had never been put to thorough in-depth analyses by the EU as regards their safety.
By the way, official Bucharest abstains from strong protests against the Belene NPP. Perhaps because the EU accepted the project calmly without politicising it unnecessarily. In April 2007 the project of the Russian reactor was granted a EUR certificate, a prestigious document, issued by the club of the European organizations, exploiting NPPs. In December of the same year the EC came with a positive report on the investment project of the construction of the Belene NPP, which would allow Bulgaria to draw the needed loans from respected European organizations, including the EIB.
There are only a few months until the start of the construction works of the Second Nuke. Bulgaria finalizes the negotiations with Western investors, willing to finance the project, while the Russian consulate, based in Ruse on the Danube, sends billeters to the small and quiet municipality of Belene. Soon, 2,000 Russian specialists are expected to arrive here, and the families of some of them will also follow them. The town on the Danube is going to become home for 5 or 6 years of one of the largest Russian colonies in Bulgaria. Well, the Russians will pay back by making Belene a symbol of the Bulgarian nuclear renaissance.
DATE: August 02, 2008
Topics: NPP, East Europe, Bulgaria, NPP Belene, Russia