Latin America is thinking over a peaceful nuclear energy. Considerable appreciation in the value of carbohydrates and desire for the energy independence make regional states - from Brazil and Argentine to Surinam return to the 80ths and turn their eyes on nuclear energy.
Latin America is not rich on NPP - there are only 6 nuclear power units (2 in Brazil, 2 in Argentine and 2 in Mexico). All the three countries cherish hopes to expand nuclear programs. President of Brazil Lula de Silva plans to finish the building of the neglected nuclear power unit "Angra-3". After that, new nuclear reactors and even an own nuclear submarine may follow.
In the neighboring Argentine the funds for the completion of the nuclear power generating unit "Atucha-2" that is already 80% completed are being allocated. They speak about reasonability of "Laguna-Verde" NPP modernization with its 20% forcing. Chile - because of the shortage of a natural gas - is ready to join a so-called Nuclear Club. Amazingly even Surinam has its nuclear plans, where ambitious businessmen would like to buy a small gas-cooled high temperature reactor of a new generation.
Circumstances make Latin-Americans act independently. The German concern "Siemens" began constructing NPP "Atucha-2" in 1981, and nowadays this company is out of nuclear business. Engineers from Argentine company "Nucleoelectrica Argentina SA" will have to assume a responsibility for completion of this facility. It should be noted that such an alternative doesn't frighten them, nuclear engineers from Argentine are totally self-reliant.
But unwarranted self-reliance may become dangerous for the region and unprofitable economically. There is an invisible, at first sight, boundary in the nuclear sector, its crossing will demand considerable losses and can course an international scandal. This is the border between reactors and nuclear fuel cycle, especially, uranium enrichment.
Uranium back doors in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
For many years control over nuclear weapons proliferation was carried out informally, by supervision of two "Big Brothers" (the USSR and the USA). In the end of 60ths leading world powers came to an agreement to put an end to such a practice and concluded a so-called "nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty". According to the treaty only 5 states gained a status of nuclear weapons possessors, and it was forbidden for all other countries to produce or to gain nuclear bombs in exchange for help in developing civil nuclear sector.
Naturally, from the first days the NPT was called discriminational. In order to attract as much states as possible to enter this treaty authors of NPT resorted to various tricks. There is no an obvious definition to such a notion as a "possession of nuclear weapons". In 1969 US national security adviser Henry Kissinger wrote: "The treaty leaves deliberately obscure the position of a nation… that might now already manufactured bit not exploded a nuclear device… Any such nation signing the treaty would presumably be declaring that is not retaining such devices, though the state of dismantling would again be left to its own good-conscience judgment."
The absence of a definite terminology resulted in the loop-holes of the treaty. Some states received a possibility to develop a peaceful nuclear energy and use the benefits of international cooperation only to withdraw from a treaty in a moment and to turn into the state armed with nuclear bombs. Obvious example of the NPT weakness is the situation in North Korea.
The most unpleasant backdoor of the treaty is considered to be the problem of uranium enrichment. A country that manages to separate uranium isotopes can be rightfully called a threshold state or a state that is close to produce nuclear weapons. At the same time, there is no a direct prohibition to acquirement of uranium enrichment technologies for non-nuclear states.
Brazil is a country that has used this loop-hole. In May 2006 uranium enrichment facility was launched in Resende. The centrifuges, that separate fertile and fissile uranium isotopes, were designed and manufactured by Brazilian engineers, including those, who are working for Navy.
IAEA takes care of the situation in Brazil. Unfortunately, remembrances of declarations and activities of junta are fresh in the memory of the international community. Inter alia, the generals bought from unknown seller supplies of high-enriched uranium, they were also building a silo on the air-force base in Cachimbo, destined, by expert opinion, for underground nuclear weapon testing.
But the main danger from Brazilian uranium enrichment program is connected not with the past of the region, but with its present. Every success of Brazilian nuclear scientists course a paroxysm of jealousy of its historic rival - Argentine. We can hear the voices from Buenos Aires, that it is necessary to build their own uranium enrichment facilities. That means, that a backdoor of NPT is overloaded by the countries who, caring for the independence and self-sufficiency of the peaceful nuclear sector, conduce to the world, that is armed to the teeth with the nuclear weapon.
Internationalization of a nuclear cycle
How is it possible to maintain the sovereign and inalienable right of Latin American states to use nuclear energy peacefully, not allowing them to the dangerous backyard of NPT? The answer is well-known. Nuclear fuel cycle facilities, especially, enrichment plants, must be taken under the multinational control, and international laws must provide all necessary guarantees of continuity and reliability of nuclear fuel supplies.
High uranium technologies may be the subject of the national proud, compared with the victory in the Football world championship. As in the case of football uranium enrichment doesn't have a direct relation to the economy. What do Brazil, Argentine and other Latin American states need are reliable nuclear reactors, which are completely provided with fuel.
There is one more problem, that was not yet completely realized by Latin America as a newcomer in the nuclear play. Spent nuclear fuel turns into the most dangerous radioactive waste. It should be placed to the special and extremely expensive geological storages for a lot of thousands years.
But the most annoying thing is that 97% of the total mass of spent fuel could be really returned to the electricity-generating production cycle. Help of so-called fast breeders - reactors on fast neutrons is needed for that. Only half a dozen states in the world possess such a technology now, and its appearance in Latin America is unlikely during some centuries.
It could be much more profitable for the regional states not to develop separate directions of a nuclear fuel cycle, spending considerable funds for that purpose and worsening relations with the world community simultaneously. Instead of these, it can be reasonable for them to turn to the leading nuclear powers and gain a full set of services from them - from nuclear fuel supplies to the solution of the nuclear wastes problem - on indiscriminative basis.
But do we have in our egoistic world such structures, which are capable of providing a full fuel set for Latin America? There are no such structures yet. But this work is in hammering now. A good example can be the initiative of a Russian President Vladimir Putin about a formation of a global nuclear infrastructure.
Russia offers to build a net of international fuel centers (IFC), acting as commercial and independent from the governments organizations in a constant contact with IAEA. The first such center - international uranium enrichment center - will appear soon in a remote Siberian city Angarsk. Such countries as Brazil and Argentina could buy the shares of this center and gain as co-owners a guaranteed access to the enriched uranium product.
An international fuel bank will be built soon near Angarsk. States, which are co-owners and clients of IFC, will be allowed to take uranium credits in case if problems with fuel provision for NPP will occur.
And a next step will be the formation of an international storage and recycling spent fuel center, where co-owners and clients of IFC can leave extracted from their reactors fuel assemblies - thereby getting rid of the spent fuel waste problem. And as a supplementary bonus Putin's plan provides the creation of international centers for high-qualified NPP personnel trainings.
Putin's suggestions seem to be rather generous and attractive. Closing a backdoor of NPT, Moscow puts forward well scrutinized and universal plan of a global nuclear infrastructure. Now nuclear novices, including Latin America, have to decide. What will Brazil and Argentine choose - a way of conflicts and extreme losses or a way of cooperation with the high-developed powers, leading to the energy stability and economic prosperity? In other words, Latin America has to decide - whether to go to the peaceful nuclear energy through the backdoor or through the main entrance.
SOURCE: Vladimir Rychin, AtomInfo.Ru
DATE: March 26, 2008
Topics: NFC